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EXIT, NO EXIT
BARBARA KOREMENOS* AND ALLISON NAU**
INTRODUCTION
Is international law rationally designed? That is, can we make sense of
all the detailed provisions that make up the typical international agreement,
features like duration provisions, escape clauses, the precision or vagueness
of an agreement’s main goals, or even withdrawal provisions? Do such
provisions vary systematically in a way that makes sense given the
problems states are trying to resolve by making international law?
Treaty design is a topic that has been the object of much research by
legal scholars, but that has garnered relatively little attention from students
of international relations (“IR”).1 Over the past decade, however, a
resurgence of interest in international law has led many from the IR field to
consider seriously the implications of the specific legal provisions that are
inscribed in international agreements.2 This Article contributes to the
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1. See, e.g., Francois S. Jones, Treaties and Treaty-Making, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 381, 420-49 (1897);
Robert R. Wilson, Revision Clauses in Treaties Since the World War, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 807, 901–
09 (1934).
2. See Barbara Koremenos, Contracting around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 473, 549-65 (2005) (arguing that finite duration provisions allow states to contract in the presence
of uncertainty because they allow for adjustment or termination if the agreement does not work as
anticipated); B. Peter V. Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 829-57 (2001) (arguing that international
institutions are likely to be more durable and stable when they include an escape clause in the design).
See generally BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS (2009) (arguing that states observe better human rights practices after they ratify human rights
treaties because ratification empowers domestic groups, and that this remains true across domains
ranging from women’s rights to civil rights to children’s rights); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that specialized domestic agencies, particularly those geared towards
regulation, can enhance domestic compliance with international treaties).
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ongoing discussion between the legal and the political science communities
by offering a theoretical argument and large-n empirical analysis3 of the
factors that condition the design of an important feature of international
agreements: withdrawal clauses.4
Building on earlier theoretical developments,5 we explain how the
inclusion of withdrawal clauses, and how their specific form, should be
understood as a rational response to the strategic environment in which
states hope to cooperate. We contend that under certain conditions, a
“quick withdrawal” could offer a strategic advantage to the withdrawing
state. In game theory, this is equivalent to the high payoff a state receives
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type game when other states cooperate while it
defects.6 Even though withdrawing is lawful and not equivalent to
defecting in that sense,7 strategically, withdrawing has the same effect as
defecting: The state that is no longer abiding by the terms of the agreement
gains while the states left cooperating lose. We argue that states can solve
this strategic problem with a withdrawal provision that includes a notice
period and that this notice period is likely to be long. The longer notice

3. A large-n analysis is a systematic statistical study of a population of cases, in this case, a large
dataset of international agreements. See generally Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that large-n statistical analysis of a scientific random sample of
international agreements allows inferences from this set of agreements to a much wider-range of cases).
This method of large-n research is in contrast to the use of descriptive inference, as commonly used in
legal scholarship, where scholars unscientifically generalize about the world from empirically
examining small parts of it. See id. at 30 (arguing that inference from large-n work—as commonly
applied in scientific studies in the natural and social sciences—adds accuracy and depth to legal
scholarship).
4. In this paper, we follow Helfer in using the terms ‘exit,’ ‘denunciation,’ and ‘withdrawal’
interchangeably. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
5. Rational Design theory is elaborated in detail below. See infra Part II; see also Barbara
Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55
INT’L ORG. 761 (2001).
6. Game theory allows us to analyze outcomes that result from strategic interactions between
actors. For instance, the Prisoner’s Dilemma models a 2-by-2 game, that is, a two player, two option
matrix, where two prisoners are taken to different rooms by cops who visit each prisoner separately.
Either prisoner can give evidence to convict the other. If neither testifies against the other, they will
both be convicted only of a very minor crime, say a one-year sentence. If Prisoner 1 testifies against
Prisoner 2 but Prisoner 2 remains silent, Prisoner 2 gets a tough sentence, say ten years, and Prisoner 1
goes free and vice versa. If both testify against the other, both get a sentence of five years. Each
prisoner makes a strategic decision, without knowing how the other prisoner will act, about whether or
not to testify based on a “dominant” strategy. Regardless of whether or not the other prisoner testifies, it
is in each prisoner’s interest to testify because he will receive a lower sentence in the event that the
other prisoner testifies or in the event that the other prisoner stays quiet. But when both prisoners act
rationally and testify against the other, they receive sentences of five years each; if they went against
their self interest and remained quiet, they would receive only one year sentences, hence the dilemma.
See ROBERT AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8 (2006).
7. See generally Helfer, supra note 4.
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period levels the playing field for all states, reducing fear that the
remaining states would be taken advantage of and eliminating one of the
advantages to withdrawing. In this way, including a withdrawal provision
with a notice period actually results in states being more willing to
cooperate in the first place since their fear of opportunistic behavior on the
part of their partners is reduced, and it makes cooperation more robust
since withdrawing will occur less often once one of the advantages to
withdrawing is reduced.
We also argue that when states face domestic commitment or time
inconsistency problems, that is, when tying their hands is in their self
interest in the long run but often politically difficult in the short run, they
write agreements that include withdrawal provisions with wait periods (the
amount of time that a state must wait before even giving notice of the intent
to withdraw) and that this wait period is likely to be long. Such provisions
help the state with the commitment problem solve its challenge and help
assure its partner states that it is indeed a credible partner in cooperation.
The next section of this paper puts the functions of exit clauses in a
broader theoretical perspective by focusing on Laurence Helfer’s article
about exit provisions. We proceed by introducing the “Rational Design”
theoretical framework to the law community, highlighting how it can shed
light on the topic at hand.8 We then present our theoretical hypotheses,
introduce the data from the Continent of International Law (“COIL”), a
research project which aims to assemble detailed information on a large
random sample of international agreements across the issue areas of
economics, environment, human rights, and security,9 and display the
results of empirical testing. The results strongly support the hypotheses.
We conclude that exit clauses are indeed rationally designed, thus
corroborating their significance as well as the meaningfulness and
rationality of international law more generally.
I. EXIT CLAUSES IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
The process of negotiating treaty provisions is costly. If we assume
that the signatory parties are rational actors, it follows that withdrawal
clauses must be beneficial, or they would not appear in agreements.
However, because states are sovereign actors, and given that there exists no
centralized mechanism for the enforcement of international agreements,
8. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 761 and accompanying pieces in the 2001 International
Organization special issue on Rational Design.
9. See generally Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law (Mannheimer Zentrum
für Europäische Sozialforschung [Mannheim Centre for European Social Research],Working Paper No.
128, 2009) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-128.pdf.
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states retain the ability to unilaterally (and illegally) defect from the
agreements they conclude. This suggests two interesting puzzles: First, why
would states codify practices that are already enabled by the anarchic
nature of the international system?10 Second, what can account for the wide
variations in the design of exit clauses?
In his 2005 article Exiting Treaties,11 Laurence Helfer answers the
first question and makes an important contribution by highlighting the very
different consequences that ensue from a unilateral and unlawful breach of
treaty obligations, relative to a public and lawful exit of one of the parties.
First, noncompliance12 does not “necessarily result in termination of
the defaulting state’s membership.” In contrast, a state that exits a treaty is
“foreclosed from the mechanisms of voice that the treaty establishes,
mechanisms that can be used to influence both the parties’ current behavior
as well as future rounds of international rulemaking.”13 Not only do
withdrawing states lose voice, but they can also be excluded from the
benefits that accrue from membership.14
Second, a state which denounces a treaty in a lawful and public
manner cannot be exposed to intra-treaty sanctions. Other signatories
cannot use the treaty’s enforcement mechanism to punish or encourage
certain types of behavior on the part of the withdrawing state. Lawful exit
may also affect other states’ ability to legitimize the use of extra-treaty
sanctions.15
10. In Koremenos et al., the Rational Design framework is presented in explicit contrast to earlier
work in the IR literature on cooperation under anarchy. The traditional view is that institutions
generally play a modest role in international politics. From our perspective however, decentralized
cooperation is difficult, but states can and do use institutions to eschew the strategic problems that are
caused by the absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5
(reviewing the literature and providing a thorough exposition of our views on the topic).
11. Helfer, supra note 4.
12. As Helfer points out, “breaches are highly varied. They may affect only a single treaty article,
a handful of obligations, or the entire treaty.” The argument put forth above holds regardless of the
extent of the breach. See id. at 1614.
13. Id. at 1613.
14. Id. at 1621. The ability to exclude a withdrawing partner from the benefits of a treaty depends
on the type of goods that are generated by it. In the case of private or club goods, exclusion is possible;
in the case of public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable, it is impossible to prevent a state
that exits from free-riding on the contributions of the members that remain. On the collective action
problem that arises when actors attempt to coordinate for the production of public goods, see generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that when a public good is
provided by a set of actors, others will “free ride” unless the good is provided to only those actors who
are active participants in the provision of the good). On the related problem of managing shared
resources, see generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990) (detailing how in the face
of temptations to free-ride, designing durable institutions of cooperation can resolve a “tragedy of the
commons”).
15. Helfer, supra note 5, at 1616-17.
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Finally, Helfer argues that “[t]he choice to denounce, together with
any explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an intent
to ‘play by the rules’ of future treaties as well. As a result, harm to the
withdrawing state’s reputation as a law abiding nation may be minimal.”16
In sum, Helfer shows that the breach of treaty obligations and the
complete withdrawal of a state yield different payoffs; the presence of an
exit clause in a treaty alters the incentive structure that states face when
they weigh the costs and benefits of cooperation versus defection. From
this vantage point, Helfer criticizes the extant international relations
literature by arguing that it has largely neglected the exit option by forcing
the real world into 2-by-2 games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma. According to
Helfer, future research should thus expand the range of available strategies
for the players.17 Analysts should also consider the interaction of problem
structure, externalities, and exit clauses.18
We take seriously Helfer’s call for an examination of the interaction of
problem structure and exit clauses. What is needed to move forward is an
approach that is internally consistent and based on solid microfoundations.19 As we show below, the Rational Design project, which
indeed moves away from 2-by-2 games, begins to respond to this need.
II. THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS20
The starting point for Rational Design is a very simple observation:
institutionalized international cooperation is organized in radically different
ways. Institutionalized international cooperation (what political scientists
call “international institutions”) is defined as explicit arrangements—
negotiated among international actors—that prescribe, proscribe, and/or
authorize behavior. This includes the tens of thousands of international
agreements that are registered with the United Nations (“UN”). But what is
16. In his article, Helfer offers a more nuanced version of this general argument, by highlighting
the importance of three variables on the reputational consequences of exit: “(1) the frequency of
denunciation and withdrawal; (2) the relationship between entering and exiting treaties; (3) the risks of
opportunism in light of the pervasive uncertainty of international affairs.” See id. at 1622.
17. Helfer considers the potential implications of extending the range of options to three in
collaboration and coordination games, but does not offer a serious game-theoretic treatment of the
question. Id. at 1629–36.
18. Id. at 1636-39.
19. By micro-foundations, we mean that the primary unit of analysis is the individual state and the
preferences it holds as well as the constraints it faces. Collective outcomes of interest are derived from
individual states interacting strategically. This is opposed to a sociological approach, for example,
where the unit of analysis is the collective and what is studied is how the collective—for example, a set
of norms—influences the individual states.
20. This section draws heavily on Koremenos et al., supra note 6, and Barbara Koremenos,
Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289 (2001).
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really important about the Rational Design agenda is the following
theoretical premise: We cannot understand institutional design and
compare across institutions/agreements without understanding the
cooperation problem(s) the institutions are trying to solve.
Consider a comparison of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) with the European Union (“EU”). Certain scholars and
policymakers contemplated a NAFTA that more closely resembled the EU.
Yet before we can compare the two to determine whether NAFTA
somehow falls short, we have to consider the cooperation problems faced
by the various actors when these institutions, including their predecessors,
were concluded. The cooperation problems Europeans faced when the
institutions of the EU began to form in post-World War II were far more
dramatic than those ever facing North America. North America and Europe
both wanted to cooperate over trade and hence faced the common
Prisoner’s Dilemma-like incentives to defect. In addition, however, the
Europeans faced a unique problem concerning Germany that could be
characterized either as a significant Uncertainty about Preferences21 (Could
Germany be trusted? Was Germany indeed a peace-loving state or would it
end up going down the same path that brought about two World Wars?), or
as a commitment problem,22 when an actor’s optimal plan today may not be
optimal at a future point in time (Was it just a matter of time before some
future German leader follows the destructive path of the past?). Given that
the Europeans had to solve either Uncertainty about Preferences or a
commitment problem, the institutional design of the EU would likely be
more elaborate than that called for by the North American environment.
Because we cannot understand institutional design and compare and
contrast international agreements without understanding the cooperation
problem(s) the agreements are trying to solve, it can be implied that
differences among international institutions or agreements are not random.
Rather, states and other international actors shape institutions to solve the
specific cooperation problems that they face. In other words, design
variations are largely the result of rational, purposeful interactions. The
goal of Rational Design is to offer a systematic account of these design
features, relating them to recurrent problems faced by states.23

21. This is one of the independent variables in the Rational Design framework, which is
elaborated below. See infra Part IV.
22. This, too, is one of the independent variables in the Rational Design framework, which is
elaborated below. See infra Part IV.
23. In game theory terms, effective international institutions are aspects of stable equilibria.
Hence, they must be incentive-compatible and robust against small perturbations. Another way of
thinking about this is to say that rational institutional design allows states to reach more efficient
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Rational Design focuses on five key dimensions of international
institutions—the dependent variables.24 These are listed below.
Membership rules (MEMBERSHIP)
Scope of issues covered (SCOPE)
Centralization of tasks (CENTRALIZATION)
Rules for controlling the institution (CONTROL)
Flexibility of arrangements (FLEXIBILITY)

These are not the only dimensions of institutions, but these are among
the most important. These different dependent variables capture important
variations in the design of international agreements. The first dependent
variable, MEMBERSHIP,25 captures who is included in the agreement: is
the membership designed to be restrictive or all-inclusive? These concepts
are not to be confused with the actual number of actors involved in the
institution. Whereas NAFTA has a small number of states, it is
institutionally less restrictive than the EU. EU members must institute low
budget deficits and criteria for human rights. The EU is thus a much more
costly institution to join than NAFTA.
The second dependent variable, SCOPE,26 details which issues will be
addressed in the agreement. In some cases this refers to a single issue area,
as in which kind of military arms are subject to the agreement, in other
cases, this refers to whether trade issues will be linked to security issues.
The third dependent variable, CENTRALIZATION,27 details which
tasks will be required to achieve cooperation, and how they will be
delegated. Whereas some tasks such as information collection, rulemaking, reviews, monitoring and dispute settlement can be centralized,
others cannot. This concept is among the more controversial design
elements, as it touches directly on national sovereignty. States are reluctant
to delegate authority since they thereby lose at least some control over the
outcome. In other words, delegation introduces risk.
CONTROL28 is the fourth dependent variable and it measures how
collective decisions will be made within the institutional arrangement. For
example, do the voting rules imply equal votes for each or a veto for a
minority? This variable addresses how members will make decisions.

cooperative equilibria and helps stabilize these equilibrium outcomes. Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at
761-63.
24. Dependent variables and their definitions were first introduced in id. at 768-69.
25. Id. at 770.
26. Id.at 770-71.
27. Id. at 771-72.
28. Id. at 772.
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Because withdrawal clauses are a form of flexibility, further
elaboration of this dependent variable is appropriate. FLEXIBILITY29
speaks to how the institutional rules and procedures will accommodate new
or changed circumstances. Included in this are not only things like duration
and renegotiation provisions, escape and withdrawal clauses, and
amendment provisions, but also the degree of precision as well as
reservations.
As part of the Rational Design argument, Koremenos et al. further
argue that variation in institutional design—that is, variation in the
dependent variables—is explained by the underlying cooperation problems
states are facing when designing their agreements: the independent
variables.30 Instead of using a typology of games, Rational Design calls for
the disaggregation of cooperation problems. Fundamentally, states
potentially face Distribution problems (which refer to the different
preferences that actors have over alternative possible agreements) and
enforcement problems (which refer to the incentives actors have to break
an agreement). These are then shaped by various degrees of Uncertainty
about Preferences (that is, uncertainty regarding what one’s partners’
preferences are), Uncertainty about Behavior (not being able to decipher
easily whether partners are cooperating or defecting), and Uncertainty
about the State of the World (that is, uncertainty regarding the
consequences of cooperation).31 Finally, the Number of Actors and
asymmetries or heterogeneity among them affect the nature of the
cooperation problem. Considering these factors independently allows for a
treatment of their univariate effects on important features of potential
institutions and hence gets around the problem of forcing real-life issues
into 2-by-2 games.
Rational Design offers a set of conjectures linking one cooperation
problem with one institutional design solution.32 While we will not
replicate the list of conjectures here, we will give a few examples from the
Rational Design introduction. Of the sixteen univariate Rational Design
conjectures relating one independent variable to one dependent variable,
three conjectures involve the dependent variable, flexibility. Two of the
three stipulate some aspect of the cooperation problem the states are facing

29. Id. at 773.
30. The independent variables were first presented and elaborated in Koremenos et al., supra note
6, at 773–75.
31. These cooperation problems are elaborated in great detail in Barbara Koremenos,
International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation (Institut Barcelona
d’Estudis Internacionals, Working Paper 2009/27, 2009).
32. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 780.
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as the independent variable: “Flexibility increases with Uncertainty about
the State of the World”33 and “Flexibility increases with the Severity of the
Distribution Problem.”34 The third conjecture pertains to transaction
costs—”Flexibility decreases with Number”35—where number can capture
the literal number of states and/or their heterogeneity.36
To illustrate the intuition underlying the relevant Rational Design
conjectures, consider the hypothesis that as a certain kind of uncertainty
increases, states will design agreements to allow for more flexibility in the
institutional rules: “Flexibility increases with Uncertainty about the State of
the World.” International cooperation is plagued by uncertainty. While
states negotiate the best agreements possible using available information,
unpredictable things happen after agreements are signed that are beyond
states’ control. States may not even commit themselves to an agreement if
they anticipate circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Certain
flexibility provisions, like duration clauses, can insure states in this context.
Ex ante, all parties would agree to such a clause in the face of the
uncertainty problem since each one is under the veil of ignorance about
who might gain or lose more than anticipated.
What does a variable like uncertainty about the state of the world look
like in real life? The best place to start the process of operationalizing and
measuring a challenging variable is through some research, which allows
one to understand the meaning of the variable in important, real-life cases.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”) is one such case.37
In Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement
Flexibility, Koremenos discusses the negotiating process of the NPT and
the potential underlying reasoning for such debate.38 It turns out that
choosing the duration and renegotiation provisions of the NPT provoked an
intense debate. The treaty negotiations lasted from 1962 to 1968. As late as
1967, the United States and the Soviet Union (the original drafters) were
pressing for a treaty with an unlimited duration while the Germans and the
Italians were emphasizing the impossibility of accepting such duration. As
the Italian representative to the negotiating committee, Caraciollo, stated:
33. Id. at 793-94.
34. Id. at 794.
35. Id.at 794-95.
36. Heterogeneity can mean different things in different contexts. For instance, in a security
agreement, the meaningful heterogeneity might be between those possessing nuclear weapons or those
not, or the dispersion of military power overall; in an economic agreement, the wealth or economic
system of the set of states might be the relevant measure, while in human rights agreements, the wider
the cultural divides, the greater the heterogeneity.
37. This example draws directly on ideas first discussed in Koremenos, supra note 20, at 304.
38. Id. at 305-08.
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“. . . it is not the lot of man, to pledge eternity. Moreover, if we look back
across our thousands of years of history, we see very few non-institutional
treaties that have simply survived the vicissitudes of one generation, let
alone achieved immortality. Therefore we fear that to affirm a principle so
remote from reality may introduce into the treaty an element of weakness
rather than of strength.”39
Hence the uncertainty about the state of the world was too high to
make non-nuclear weapon states comfortable accepting an indefinitely long
agreement. What did this uncertainty look like in real life? First, there were
uncertainties surrounding the security consequences of the treaty. These
included uncertainty about the effort that the nuclear weapon states would
put into nuclear disarmament, uncertainties about extended deterrence, and
uncertainties about which countries would end up participating in the
regime.
Second, there were uncertainties surrounding the economic
consequences of the treaty. These included whether the treaty might restrict
non-nuclear weapon states’ ability to make peaceful use of nuclear energy,
how economically costly the International Atomic Energy Agency
monitoring would turn out to be, and whether states that were not parties to
the treaty might be able to obtain nuclear technology with fewer restrictions
than signatory states.
Third, there were uncertainties surrounding the political consequences
of the treaty. In particular, Italy worried that the distribution of gains from
the NPT would skew the distribution of power in Europe in ways that
would make European integration difficult if not impossible.
Essentially, this great uncertainty about the state of the world—that is,
uncertainty about how the agreement would turn out in terms of its
distribution of costs and benefits—forced the Soviet Union and the United
States to compromise their desire for an indefinite agreement. What
resulted from the negotiations was a twenty-five year duration agreement,
with reviews every five years. The institutional design choice of flexibility
helped states solve the cooperation problem.
Every Rational Design conjecture has game-theoretic underpinnings.
As an example, it might be helpful to elaborate the theory informing this
particular Rational Design conjecture of “Flexibility increases with
Uncertainty about the State of the World.”
The conjecture has its origins in work in economics, especially,
contract theory. Economists have long recognized the importance of
39. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement by the Italian Representative
(Caracciolo) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, DOC. ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 528.
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flexibility. Two particularly important papers that have theorized it are
Gray40 and Harris and Holmstrom.41 The Gray paper grew out of attempts
to model the role of incomplete contracts42 at the microeconomic level in
bringing about sticky wages at the macroeconomic level.43 In the Harris
and Holmstrom model, renegotiation is synonymous with paying a cost to
learn the true value of the underlying state of the world variable. In both
models of contract duration, the fundamental tradeoff is between the
frequency with which the contracting costs are paid and the disutility of
having a contract whose terms do not correspond well to the realized state
of the world.
As Rational Design would predict, states do indeed routinely
introduce flexibility mechanisms in their international agreements in order
to cope with uncertainty. Koremenos and Helfer argue that such provisions
act as an insurance policy, allowing states to conclude more agreements in
the first place, negotiate more expansive or deeper substantive,
commitments, and keep their agreements longer without defecting.44 Kucik
and Reinhardt use an innovative research design to determine whether or
not the ability to temporarily suspend trade concessions improves the
likelihood that states will sign trade agreements.45
Connecting uncertainty and exit clauses, Helfer states: “Uncertainty is
a pervasive feature of international affairs. Denunciation clauses reduce
uncertainty by giving states a low cost exit option if an agreement turns out
badly. All other things being equal, such clauses encourage the ratification

40. See generally Jo Anna Gray, On Indexation and Contract Length, 86 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1978).
41. See generally Milton Harris & Bengt Holstrom, On the Duration of Agreements, 26 INT’L
ECON. REV. 389 (1987).
42. Incomplete contracts are drawn out because parties face uncertainty about the future when
designing a contract and detailing each contingency for all possible outcomes is impossible. See
generally Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC
THEORY 71, 71–155 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987) (arguing that with transaction costs, incomplete
contracts are necessary because the costs of making agreements completely contingent are too high for
the parties to choose to do so).
43. Gray's analysis illustrates the important general point that in the absence of some costs of
contracting, contracts would always be written to end whenever new information arrives so that a new
contract could be concluded that incorporates the new information. In contrast, in the presence of fixed
costs to contracting (these costs may result from, for example, the costs of negotiation), there is a
tradeoff between contracting costs and the divergence between the actual contract parameters and those
that are optimal for the (evolving) state of the world. Gray's model embodies this fundamental tradeoff.
She examines the choice of the optimal duration (and level of indexing) for a single contract given this
tradeoff. Gray, supra note 40, at 7.
44. See generally Koremenos, supra note 20; Helfer, supra note 4.
45. Jeffrey Kucik & Eric Reinhardt, Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the
Global Trade Regime, 62 Int’l Org 477, 499-500 (2008) (arguing that states that incorporate flexibility
through the use of antidumping mechanisms are more likely to commit to binding trade agreements).
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of a treaty by a larger number of states than would be prepared to ratify in
the absence of such a clause.”46
Koremenos refines this particular statement with an analysis that
connects particular kinds of flexibility mechanisms with distinctive kinds
of uncertainty. Koremenos provides a formal model of duration clauses and
argues that that type of flexibility is the superior or optimal response to the
kind of uncertainty the Helfer quote describes: the uncertainty surrounding
how an agreement may turn out.
What is it that makes a finite duration with the possibility of
renegotiation uniquely important in this context? This particular
institutional design allows adjustment in the face of international
uncertainty without dismantling cooperation.47 Why should states
contemplate complete withdrawal when they can instead renegotiate or
amend an agreement so that the agreement can then accommodate the
difficult-to-predict experience of the states? A systematic statistical study
using a large dataset of international agreements—a large-n empirical
analysis—allows us to understand whether or not Koremenos’ conjectures
about these variables are correct. In using this kind of statistical analysis,
she can confirm that duration provisions are indeed used for this purpose.48
Koremenos analyzes both escape clauses (often called derogation clauses)
and withdrawal clauses to see if they are substitutes for limited duration
provisions as a response to this kind of uncertainty. They are not. Escape
clauses do not permit adjustment; rather, they allow states to temporarily
escape cooperation and return to an unadjusted agreement. Escape clauses
are, however, appropriate responses to domestic uncertainty. States may
agree to particular terms of cooperation but then suffer domestic shocks
that make these terms politically difficult. What they require then is a
temporary relief from their obligations. Even the typical wording of escape
clauses suggests this purpose: “extraordinary circumstances that jeopardize
extreme national interests.” Human rights agreements contain significantly
more escape clauses than agreements in other issue areas, with the
domestic shock usually being civil war. Article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states “[i]n time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . [states] may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the [agreement] to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”49 If a state takes
46.
47.
48.
49.
174.

Helfer, supra note 4, at 1599.
Koremenos, supra note 2, at 561.
Id. at 560.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
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such measures, it must inform other state parties through the SecretaryGeneral of the UN regarding “the provisions from which it has derogated
and of the reasons by which it was actuated.”50
Withdrawal clauses are also very different from duration provisions
because cooperative institutions cease to exist in the bilateral cases (by far,
the majority) or the membership changes in a multilateral setting. The latter
can be quite consequential: when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the agreement remained intact, yet the
implications of the membership change were serious. Koremenos argues
that withdrawal clauses are responses to shocks that alter a state’s basic
interest in cooperation. Although such shocks occur less frequently than
unpredicted outcomes or domestic shocks, the risk they impose is great.
Therefore, we might expect that states will more often than not include
withdrawal provisions in their agreements. The relationship between
“bedrock” preferences, which are fundamentally stable, and constraints,
which arise from the fact that the state is a composite actor, also provides
insight.51 Withdrawal clauses are used in the event of “bedrock” changes
while escape clauses are used in the event of unchanged bedrock
preferences but different domestic constraints.52
Using a random sample of agreements, Koremenos finds that 62
percent of the agreements have withdrawal provisions and about 8 percent
have escape clauses, but the correlation among these variables and duration
provisions never exceeds 0.18.53 Flexibility provisions are not simply
chosen as a set; nor do particular pairs go together. The problems these
provisions uniquely solve occur in different combinations depending on the
cooperative endeavor. The conclusion to be drawn is that the landscape of
international law is far from crude.54

50. Id.
51. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncon Snidal, Rational Design: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051, 1073 (2001).
52. Koremenos, supra note 2.
53. Id. at 561.
54. Although escape and withdrawal clauses seem to solve different problems than finite duration,
there is another design tool that allows adjustment in the face of shocks: an agreement embodying a
quasi-legislative institution with the power to modify the distribution of gains. The International
Monetary Fund provides a good example of an indefinite duration agreement that establishes an
institution that does many things including, importantly, adjusting the distribution of gains. Koremenos
(2000) argues that such a design may be optimal when uncertainty regarding future gains is pervasive,
but renegotiation costs are high because of the number of parties involved. In this context, an institution
with an amendment provision characterized by majority rule cuts down on adjustment costs relative to a
full renegotiation. See Barbara Koremenos, Bending but Not Breaking: Flexibility in International
Financial and Monetary Agreements, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley: Ctr. for German and European Studies,
Working Paper 1.73, 2000).
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III. A THEORY OF EXIT CLAUSE DESIGN
Focusing on exit clauses, we observe a high degree of variation in the
substantive legal provisions that compose them. Helfer uses the handbook
provided by the United Nations55 that many international lawyers reference
and finds that:
[W]ithdrawal clauses cluster around six ideal types: (1) treaties that
may be denounced at any time; (2) treaties that preclude denunciation
for a fixed number of years, calculated either from the date the
agreement enters into force or from the date of ratification by the state;
(3) treaties that permit denunciation only at fixed time intervals; (4)
treaties that may be denounced only on a single occasion, identified
either by time period or upon the occurrence of a particular event; (5)
treaties whose denunciation occurs automatically upon the state’s
ratification of a subsequently-negotiated agreement; and (6) treaties
that are silent as to denunciation or withdrawal.56

Data from COIL, elaborated below, also highlights the wide
substantive differences in exit clauses. The majority of exit clauses take the
form of categories 1, 2, and 6 above, but a few agreements from the
random sample are characterized by categories 3, 4, and 5. The theoretical
and empirical work presented below focuses on two dimensions of this
variation: the length of the notice period, if any, that states are required to
give before exiting a treaty (“notice period”), and the length of time that
has to elapse between treaty ratification and a state being completely freed
of its obligations (“wait period”). Each of these is discussed in detail
below.

55. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES
HANDBOOK, UN Sales No E.04.V.3 (2003).
56. Helfer, supra note 4, at 1597. There subsists a doctrinal debate about whether or not “silent”
treaties preclude exit altogether. On the one hand, the principle of state sovereignty may imply that
states automatically reserve the right to withdraw from a treaty, even if the text does not include a
denunciation clause. On the other, omitting to include such a clause might suggest that the signatory
parties intend to make a treaty permanent (e.g. in high stakes issue areas such as peace agreements). A
widely used approach to this question is set forth in Article 56 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: “A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide
for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) [i]t is established
that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) [a] right of
denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 56(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For brief overviews of this question, see John
Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in Consular
Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 291-92 (2008); Helfer, supra
note 4, at 1593–94, 97.
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A. Notice Period
A notice period is the amount of time between the point at which a
member gives notice of its withdrawal and the point at which its
withdrawal becomes effective. There is tremendous variation in the length
of the notice period states are required to give before exiting a treaty.
What explains the inclusion and length of the notice period?
Following Rational Design, we can ask, what strategic underlying problems
might cause states to want a longer notice period? If states were required to
modify domestic policies as a treaty enters into force, they would likely
have to change domestic policies again to accommodate for the change in
circumstances caused by the withdrawal of another state from the treaty.
Agreements based on reciprocal behavior would require a change in
domestic policy for all parties if one state withdrew from the agreement.57
A notice period would allow signatory states to adjust their own policies
prior to the withdrawal of an individual state. This period of time to adjust
policies is particularly important when states face an enforcement problem.
An enforcement problem is present when actors have incentives to
defect from cooperation. Even if a cooperative arrangement makes
everyone better off, some or all actors may prefer not to adhere to it
because they can do better individually by cheating. Issues are
characterized by enforcement problems when actors find current, unilateral
noncooperation so enticing that they sacrifice long-term cooperation. This,
of course, is the predicament of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and
public goods problems.58 At one extreme are cases with no enforcement
problem: When states need to set technical standards, actors will have no
incentive to defect once such an agreement has been reached. Within the
context of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, the enforcement problem
may be minimal if incentives to defect are small relative to the shadow of

57. Arms control agreements between superpowers are examples of agreements designed on the
principle of reciprocal behavior. For instance, in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. expected that the treaty’s provisions would be upheld by each other. Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Balistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 May, 1972, 23 U.S.T.S. 3435. Without reciprocity,
the legitimacy of the treaty would have been undermined.
58. While defecting is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, once
the game is repeated, other equilibria emerge. In fact, repeated play often makes possible the Paretoefficient equilibrium in which both parties cooperate. Usually, however, this equilibrium is supported
by a threat, also known as the grim trigger strategy: if one party defects, the other party will start
defecting and defect forever. Consequently, in this case, both parties lose when one party’s defection is
followed by another’s, and this threat allows cooperation to continue despite the short-term gain from
defection.
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the future.59 But as incentives to defect are greater, or interactions are less
frequent, enforcement problems emerge.
The 1925 Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment for National
and Foreign Workers as Regards Workmen’s Compensation for
Accidents60 is an example of a human rights agreement61 in which one of
the underlying cooperation problems is an enforcement problem. The
enforcement problem is created by the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure of the
game: A state wants its workers to be treated well in other states, but would
prefer not to spend resources on foreigners within its borders.62
Agreements whose goal it is to solve underlying enforcement
problems may include institutional design features like rewards and
punishments or dispute resolution provisions to try to change the short-term
incentives of states to defect. Still, there remains the possibility that a
“quick withdrawal” could offer a strategic advantage to the withdrawing
state, in the same way that a “sneak attack” offers an advantage to a state at
war. It can be assumed that the withdrawing state knows that it wants to
withdraw before it announces it. If it could withdraw immediately, it could
have a strategic advantage by surprising other states with the
announcement since other states would not have had time to accommodate.
This is equivalent to the high payoff a defecting state receives in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game when others cooperate while it defects. Even
though withdrawing is lawful and not equivalent to defecting from a strict
international law standpoint, strategically, withdrawing has the same effect
as defecting: the state that is no longer abiding by the terms of the
agreement gains while the states left cooperating lose. In a sense, including
a notice period levels the playing field for all states, reducing fear that the
remaining states would be taken advantage of and eliminating the
advantage to withdrawing. Put differently, a notice period changes the

59. The shadow of the future is the expectation of benefits from future interaction and their value.
Thus, a long shadow implies both that actors have a sufficiently high density of interaction and that they
assign a sufficiently high value to the future.
60. Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment for National and Foreign Workers as Regards
Workmen's Compensation for Accidents, June 5, 1925, 38 U.N.T.S. 257.
61. In addition to the “core” multilateral human rights agreements that are very well known (e.g.,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child) the UNTS categorizes a number of bilateral agreements such
as this one as being in the issue area of human rights, given that the rights of foreign citizens are
addressed.
62. That is, State A would like its workers to be treated well but would prefer not to spend
resources on State B’s workers. State B feels the same way. However, both State A and State B would
prefer to both spend resources on each other’s workers than for neither to spend resources. In other
words, cooperate-cooperate as a strategy pair is Pareto optimal to defect-defect, despite the desire of
both parties to be the only defector while the other cooperates. This is the essence of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game structure.
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nature of the game by precluding the high payoff that comes from
unilateral defection while another state cooperates. The inclusion of a
notice period allows the other state the option of ceasing cooperation as
well. Because what would likely result is the strategy pair defect-defect,
which is Pareto suboptimal as well as individually inferior to cooperatecooperate, all other things equal, states will cease cooperation less often.
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis:
(N-1)63 Ceteris paribus, agreements that are characterized by an
underlying enforcement problem are more likely to include notice
periods than those not characterized by an underlying enforcement
problem.

Should states choose to include a withdrawal notice period in their
agreements, the same reasoning applies to the length of the notice period.
When states fear a bad payoff from another state’s withdrawal because of
the underlying strategic structure of the situation in which they are
cooperating, they will want greater warning time to be able to adjust their
policies.
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis:
(N-2) Ceteris paribus, if the parties conclude an agreement with a
notice period, those agreements that are characterized by an underlying
enforcement problem are more likely to feature longer notice periods
than those not characterized by an underlying enforcement problem.

Thus, an underlying enforcement problem leads states to include a
notice period, but we do not claim that this is the only factor states
consider. In other words, we are not offering a complete theory of notice
periods. Once states decide to include a notice period, the same underlying
enforcement problem leads them to make the notice period longer.
B. Withdrawal Waiting Period
Another very important design element of some withdrawal provisions
is what we label the withdrawal waiting period. A withdrawal waiting
period is the designated period of time before a member that wants to
withdraw from the agreement is fully freed from its commitments under the
agreement. Some agreements specify a certain amount of time that member
states must remain bound by the agreement before they are even allowed to
give notice to withdraw. Additionally, while members are usually freed
from their commitments on withdrawal, some agreements extend a state’s

63. N stands for notice period; below, W stands for waiting period.
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commitments beyond the point of its withdrawal. Bilateral investment
agreements, for example, usually extend protections for investments that
were made before notice of termination an additional number of years. The
withdrawal waiting period can thus include up to three distinct periods:
first, any period that does not allow withdrawal; second, the withdrawal
notice period; and third, the length of time that states are bound to an
agreement’s provisions beyond withdrawal. An agreement may include any
or all of these periods. The total amount of time between the entry into
force of the agreement and the full release of member obligation is the
withdrawal waiting period.
Consider the 1982 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of
Investments between Sweden and China.64 Article 9 states:
(1) This Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature.
(2) This agreement shall remain in force for a period of fifteen years
and shall continue in force thereafter unless, after the expiry of the
initial period of fourteen years, either Contracting State notifies in
writing the other Contracting State of its intention to terminate this
Agreement. The notice of termination shall become effective one year
after it has been received by the other Contracting State.
(3) In respect of investments made prior to the date when the notice of
termination of this Agreement becomes effective, the provisions of
articles 1 to 8 shall remain in force for a further period of fifteen years
from that date.65

The agreement, therefore, has a thirty-year withdrawal waiting period:
a minimum of fourteen years initial duration plus a one-year withdrawal
notice period plus a fifteen-year period of coverage of any investments
made before notice of termination was given.
With respect to what kind of strategic problem might call for a
withdrawal waiting period in the first place, or a longer withdrawal waiting
period conditional on having one, consider commitment problems or timeinconsistency problems. Negotiating, ratifying, and complying with
international agreements often pose heavy initial short-run costs before
longer-term benefits can be enjoyed. Domestic political pressures may be
such that certain leaders will want to withdraw because of these short-term
costs before long-term benefits are realized.
The tradeoff between short-term costs and long-term gains is not only
a problem for states vis-à-vis other states, but is also often an issue within a

64. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-Swed. art. 9, Mar. 29, 1982, 1350
U.N.T.S. 255. This agreement is contained in the random sample used in this study.
65. Id.
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signatory state. A forward-looking leader may want to sign an agreement
that is unpopular with the domestic audience because of costly
technological adjustment or some other kind of initial heavy investment,
but that will reap substantial social welfare-enhancing benefits in the long
run. Alternatively, a state with high levels of political leadership turnover
may want to strengthen its credibility. The problem posed by short-term
losses and long-term gains is very typical of a commitment problem.
The term commitment problem refers to a domestic commitment
problem or a time-inconsistency problem. A time-inconsistency problem
describes a situation in which an actor’s best plan for some future period is
inconsistent over time. Take the following agreement for which the
cooperation problem is characterized by a commitment problem: the 1980
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
United Kingdom and Bangladesh.66 Given its tumultuous political history,
including military coups in the 1970s, Bangladesh has a credibility problem
regarding the safety of outside investments.67 Hence, it needs to tie its
hands in the present so that it will not give into pressures to nationalize or
expropriate outside investments. This is especially important given
outsiders’ perception of the likelihood of a regime change in Bangladesh;
potential investors will likely not invest without some credible commitment
on the part of Bangladesh to uphold its promise. If Bangladesh can
withstand political pressures to not cooperate regarding protection of
investments, its long-term credibility will be enhanced and it will attract
even more investment, which will allow it to reap a steady flow of benefits.
In addition, because an early withdrawal by one state reduces the
payoffs to the remaining states in the agreement, which then may have paid
too high a price for the reduced expected payoffs, under certain conditions
ex ante states would want to prevent themselves from withdrawing
prematurely to avoid a net loss.
We therefore hypothesize that agreements for which one of the goals
includes solving an underlying commitment problem are more likely to
have wait periods than those without such a goal. All states will find it in
their interest to write such a provision, whether they are tying their own
hands or those of their partner(s) in cooperation who have the commitment
problem.
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis:

66. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bangl.-U.K., June 19, 1980,
1212 U.N.T.S. 97.
67. Background Note: Bangladesh, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 24 2010), http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.
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(W-1) Ceteris paribus, agreements that are characterized by an
underlying commitment problem are more likely to include withdrawal
wait periods than those not characterized by an underlying
commitment problem.

Should states choose to include a withdrawal wait period in their
agreements, the same reasoning applies to the length of the wait period.
When states fear their own or another state’s premature withdrawal because
of the underlying strategic structure that poses short-term incentives to stop
cooperating, they will want to tie their hands for a longer period.
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis:
(W-2) Ceteris paribus, if the parties conclude an agreement with a wait
period, those agreements that are characterized by an underlying
commitment problem are more likely to feature longer wait periods
than those not characterized by an underlying commitment problem.

Thus an underlying commitment problem leads states to include a wait
period. We are not claiming that it is the only factor that states consider
when deciding whether to include wait periods or not, but that it is an
important single factor in their decision-making. Once states decide to
include a wait period, the underlying commitment problem leads them to
make the wait period longer.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS68
A. Data: The Continent of International Law69
Testing these four hypotheses requires data. To that end, data were
collected on the characteristics of a random sample of international
agreements drawn from the United Nations Treaty Series (“UNTS”).70 The
random sample is conditional on four issue areas: economics, environment,
human rights, and security. The data collection was informed, both in terms
of what variables were coded and how they were measured, by Rational

68. Those wishing to replicate the results should access the “Exit, No Exit” data files available at
my website. Barbara Koremenos, Research, U. MICH., http://sitemaker.umich.edu/koremenos/research
(last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
69. The Continent of International Law (COIL) research project has been and is currently funded
by the National Science Foundation (SES-0094376 and SES-0801581). Barbara Koremenos is the
Principle Investigator. See Koremenos, supra note 9.
70. The internet collection at the time the sample was drawn contained over 34,000 international
agreements, “which have been published in hard copy in over 1,450 volumes, which corresponds to all
treaties and subsequent actions registered up to December 1986.” See United Nations Treaty Series
Online Collection, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1.
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Design theories and by other theoretical approaches in international
relations.71
Defining the population of interest represents a crucial first step in any
sampling exercise, and in this context it meant answering the question of
exactly what counted as an international agreement. Inclusion criteria were
developed through an iterative process that included consultation with
experts in the field, including senior scholars in international relations and
international law as well as policymakers at the U.S. State Department’s
Office of Treaty Affairs.
Essentially, every agreement found in the UNTS was considered an
international agreement for the purposes of this study unless it was
excluded by one of the following five rules:72 First, agreements whose
primary ambition was to either establish the procedures and/or
arrangements for the goals of negotiations of other agreements, or
designate the host state of an international conference were excluded.
Second, agreements not between at least two states were excluded. Thus,
agreements between one state and an international organization were
excluded; agreements that are negotiated within an international
organization but that involve two or more states were included. Third,
agreements that do not prescribe, proscribe, or authorize behavior that is
observable in principle were excluded. That is, agreements that are not
specific enough to include (at least potentially) objective criteria for
determining performance were excluded from the sample. Fourth, the study
excluded agreements whose sole ambition is to implement the provisions of
other international agreements.73 That is, agreements whose terms are

71. The coding of the dataset COIL incorporated some of the key variables from other core
theories in International Relations. These include Realism, which theorizes that international institutions
reflect power relationships between states, see generally, JOHN MEARSHEIMER, TRAGEDY OF GREAT
POWER POLITICS (2001), and Constructivism, which focuses on how norms can triumph over power
relations in international institutions and ultimately affect international policy outcomes, see generally,
M. KECK & K. SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1998). Thus, the COIL data collection featured a question about how symmetric the
international agreement in question is, with three possible answers: symmetric, mildly asymmetric, and
profoundly asymmetric. The NPT is an example of a profoundly asymmetric agreement in that its main
substantive provisions favor powerful actors whereas the International Monetary Fund is an example of
a mildly asymmetric agreement in that the more wealthy states have greater voting power. To measure a
variable central to the Constructivist framework, the role of norms, the COIL coding instrument asked
the coder to identify the balance of prescriptions, proscriptions and authorizations (hard law) and
recommendations and suggestions (soft law).
72. These rules first appear in Koremenos, supra note 9, at 8.
73. Rules 3 and 4 derive from Coordination, Reporting and Publication of International
Agreements, 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(3), (c) (2006). The purpose of that document is to implement the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act. The Case-Zablocki Act calls for the full and timely disclosure to
the U.S. Congress of all concluded international agreements to which the U.S. is a party. The document
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closely anticipated and identified in the underlying agreement were
excluded from the sample. Examples of implementing agreements that
were included in the sample are those that both implement and extend the
underlying agreement, those that specify and/or interpret the provisions of a
vague underlying agreement that would be excluded, and those that
implement a law of a particular state.74 Fifth, agreements that were
extended through time, whether by default after the passage of a specified
duration or by means other than default, were counted only once, not as
separate international agreements. Renegotiated agreements, on the other
hand, constituted separate international agreements.75
The current sample of agreements can be found in the Appendix. It is
important to note that, by far, the great majority of excluded agreements
were between one state and an Intergovernmental Organization (“IGO”),
requiring no judgment calls to be made. Only a couple of agreements were
excluded under the fourth rule. The Protocol on the construction and
maintenance of reindeer fences76 between Sweden and Norway was
excluded because it implements the Agreement between Sweden and
Norway on the grazing of reindeer;77 the latter agreement calls for the
construction of fences, but leaves the details concerning placement and
design for a special agreement. There were no agreements excluded under
the fifth rule given that extensions and renegotiations of agreements
counted in the same way the UNTS does.
A coding instrument was used to record the characteristics of the
agreements.78 Among the provisions coded were flexibility provisions (e.g.,
Can a subset of states amend the agreement? If so, is it binding on all
members? Are there certain provisions that states can opt out of but still
retain membership in the agreement?); membership provisions (e.g., Are

identifies criteria for determining whether any undertaking between the U.S. government or an agency
of the U.S. government) and another state constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of
the Act.
74. In the 1950s, the United States signed a series of bilateral agreements with its allies, including
a number of European countries, to implement the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. These bilateral
agreements are examples of implementing agreements that implement a domestic law of one of the
parties. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to Mutual Security, U.S.Greece, Dec. 21, 1951 180 U.N.T.S. 2382.
75. Agreements that are extended are not considered original agreements in the UNTS. Those that
are renegotiated, that is, those for which the renegotiated agreement supplants the original agreement,
are considered original agreements in the UNTS.
76. Protocol on the Construction and Maintenance of Reindeer Fences, Nor.-Swed., May 1, 1972,
968 U.N.T.S. 344.
77. Agreement on the Grazing of Reindeer, Nor.-Swed., Feb. 9, 1972, 969 U.N.T.S. 44.
78. For a more detailed discussion of the coding instrument, see Koremenos, supra note 9, at 9–
11.
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there particular member states that must ratify the agreement before it
enters into force? Are non-state actors given any rights or
responsibilities?); provisions related to monitoring and compliance (e.g.,
Do states exchange information? Is the information self-reported or
gathered by an independent agency? Are there penalties for failure to
comply with agreement provisions?); and references to other international
agreements. These are just a sprinkling of the characteristics coded. While
almost 70 percent of the coding instrument was devoted to design issues,
the remaining questions addressed more substantive issues. For example,
coders listed the most important prescriptions/proscriptions versus
recommendations/suggestions. These particular questions will inform a
study of how international law evolves, including the role of norms, which
is a hotly debated topic.79
The coders for this project were extensively trained to ensure that they
obtained high levels of competency and consistency.80 Two coders
independently coded each agreement using an online survey instrument.
After they completed their surveys, an intercoder reliability report was
generated for the 375 questions for which there are “quantitative” answers,
like yes/no, multiple choice, or a number.81 (There were an additional 160
fill-in questions.) The average coded agreement was characterized by
disagreement on approximately 15 questions, or four percent of the
quantitative questions; the range was between two and 11 percent. Hence,
from an intercoder reliability standpoint, these statistics are excellent. The
inconsistencies were resolved through a close rereading of the agreement
and supervised discussion involving the original coders, a trained graduate
student, and Koremenos.82

79. See Steven R. Ratner, The Trials of Global Norms, 110 FOREIGN POL’Y 65, 65–80 (1998)
(arguing that international lawyers must begin to acknowledge that in addition to treaties and customary
law, norms are arising as another important category of law); Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms
Distinctive?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 669, 701–05 (2000) (arguing for the need for the detailing of
distinctive features of legal norms so as to understand their effects on international politics).
80. The majority of coders went through 9-12 months of course-based training, which included
both theoretical training and practice coding runs. For further details, see Koremenos, supra note 9, at
9–11.
81. Because building this dataset involved translating qualitative work in the form of international
agreements into quantitative data, we had to establish that this kind of non-numeric information would
be quantified the same way regardless of who is quantifying it. An intercoder reliability reports details
when two people have quantified non-numeric information differently, so that those researchers can
revisit that information and establish correct quantifications according to definitions set forth in a
codebook.
82. COIL data are featured in several of Koremenos’ articles. See, e.g., Koremenos, supra note 2,
at 554; Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 JOURNAL LEGAL STUD. 189, 194–98 (2007); Barbara
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B. Dependent Variables
We operationalize the dependent variables as follows. As defined
above, a withdrawal notice provision stipulates that a state must give notice
before it can withdraw from an international agreement; a withdrawal
notice period is specified as the length of time in months that must pass
after a state has announced its intention to withdraw before that withdrawal
can go into effect. A withdrawal wait provision stipulates that a state is
bound for a certain period of time before it can be free of its international
obligations; a wait period is the specified length of time in fractional years
that must pass before a state is completely free of its obligations under the
agreement—typically, after giving notice and withdrawing. Importantly,
although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates some
rules regarding exit, the dependent variables used in this analysis are
measured according to the agreement text.83
C. Independent Variables
Given Rational Design’s focus on the underlying cooperation
problems that states face as one of the main determinants of institutional
design, the two independent variables used in the analyses below are an
underlying enforcement problem and an underlying commitment problem.
Examples of these variables are given above, but it is important to ask how
such variables are operationalized for a large-n sample.
As noted above, two trained coders carefully read the international
agreement and coded hundreds of institutional design variables.
Independently, a graduate student with training in rationalist approaches to
international cooperation and Koremenos also looked at the agreement and
answered, among others, the following substantive question: How can the
cooperation problem be characterized? In addition to the independent
variables elaborated in Rational Design, Koremenos added the following
possible answers: commitment problem, positive externalities, negative
externalities, deadlock, and other. (“other” captures areas of cooperation
such as foreign aid for which there are no or little strategic considerations,
pure coordination games, and the exportation or codification of norms as in
the human rights as well as environmental issue area.)84 More than one

Koremenos, When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151,
155–92 (2008).
83. See discussion supra note 53.
84. Full definitions of these cooperation problems are given in the glossary online. See supra note
64.
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answer could be chosen for each agreement since real-life issues are
characterized by multiple cooperation problems.
Obviously, these questions are not nearly as straightforward as those
pertaining to agreement design. Indeed, there is an inference that had to be
made from the agreement to the cooperation problem. There is no way
around this in such a study using a random sample of agreements given the
observations are the agreements themselves and they cut across diverse
issue and sub-issue areas. Nonetheless, there are some factors that should
alleviate concerns.85 First, the inference came by looking at relevant
background information. Sometimes, negotiators reveal the problems they
were attempting to solve, which is documented. Unfortunately, this was not
always the case for an agreement from the random sample; rather, research
needed to be done more broadly on the relationship among the relevant
states and the general problems of the sub-issue at the time. For example, in
a bilateral agreement, the relationship of the dyad in the decade or two
before the agreement is signed was examined. Also, only the substantive
goals of the agreement were looked at when trying to infer the underlying
cooperation problem(s). Given that the theoretical work focuses on
explaining the procedural or design aspects of the agreements, the
separation of coders for, what are in these analyses, the independent and
dependent variables was critical to the integrity of the project. This
approach was extremely labor intensive, but by employing different and
multiple sets of trained coders, political science and law scholars can have
confidence in the resulting data.
In addition to the examples given in the theoretical section above,
consider the following examples of the two independent variables.86 The
Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Sound Oresund from
Pollution87 between Denmark and Sweden in 1974 is coded as having an
underlying enforcement problem. The assigned coder wrote: “Even though
there was a significant shadow of the future88 between Denmark and
Sweden, there were strong economic incentives to defect from the
agreement: less regulation or wastewater treatment would mean more
economic freedom for municipalities and more profits for industries. The
situation was further complicated by the existence of a two-level game
between the government and industry.”89
85. This idea draws from Koremenos, supra note 9, at 11.
86. These examples first appeared in id. at 11–12.
87. Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Sound Oresund from Pollution, Den.-Swed., Apr.
5, 1974 , 962 U.N.T.S. 205.
88. See supra note 56.
89. Koremenos, supra note 9, at 12.
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The Convention on the Protection of Investments signed in 1973
between France and Mauritius90 was coded as having an underlying
commitment problem. Drawing on research conducted by a law scholar, the
coder wrote: “Given its tumultuous history, Mauritius wants to tie its hands
in case of future regime change so that foreigners will invest.”91
Thus, each agreement in the sample was coded for every cooperation
problem as either high—meaning that the underlying problem existed to a
great degree—or low—meaning the underlying problem existed to a low
degree. Agreements for which the enforcement problem was coded as high
received ones while those which were characterized by low enforcement
problems received zeros; the same coding applied to commitment problem.
D. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1-3 present a first glance at the incidence of the variables of
interest. With a random sample of 142 agreements, some interesting
findings emerge. Table 1 demonstrates that the incidence of a withdrawal
clause varies by issue area, with human rights agreement almost always
incorporating them but more than half of the security agreements in the
sample failing to do so. Overall, 60% of the agreements contain an exit
clause.
Table 1: Withdrawal Clauses:
Number of Agreements
Issue Area

Have withdrawal

Do

clause

withdrawal

not

have

clause
Economic

39

30

Environmental

16

9

Human Rights

20

3

Security

11

14

Total

86

56

Table 2 illustrates the variation in the length of notice periods of the
86 agreements in the random sample that have withdrawal clauses. Notice
periods range from less than one month to twenty-four months, with a
twelve-month period being the most popular. Other popular notice period
lengths include 3 months and 6 months.
90. Convention Concerning the Protection of Investments, Fr.-Mauritius Mar. 22, 1973, 940
U.N.T.S 309.
91. Koremenos, supra note 9, at 12. See generally Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for
Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107
(2005) (exploring the relationships and consequences that result from Bilateral Investment Treaties as
countries pursue treaties as a potential international alternative to domestic institutional protection).
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Table 2: Length of Notice Periods
Length of time specified,

Number of treaties

in months
0

1

1

8

2

1

3

12

4

2

6

19

9

1

12

41

24

1

Total

85

Finally, Table 3 illustrates the substantial variation in the withdrawal
wait periods, for those agreements that include them. While the most
common wait period is one year or less, the majority of agreements that
include wait periods specify a period of time greater than one year, with a
nontrivial number of agreements specifying ten to twenty years.
Table 3: Length of Wait Period
Length of Wait Period in

Number of Treaties

fractional years
1 year or less

27

1 to 5 years

17

5 to 10 years

12

10 to 20 years

13

20 to 31 years

14

Total

83

Mean

6.88

Standard Deviation

8.45
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E. Statistical Results
To test hypotheses N-1 and N-2 as well as W-1 and W-2, we use both
probit and Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) regressions. Probit enables us
to examine whether the particular cooperation problems of enforcement
and commitment make it more likely that states will include notice periods
and wait periods, respectively. OLS regression enables us to determine the
effect that these particular strategic problems have on the length of the
notice and wait periods for those agreements that incorporate them.92
We also include dummy variables93 for the human rights, economic,
and environmental issue areas (security is the excluded category) because
the random sample is conditional on issue area. This is the first theory of
withdrawal provision variation; no other independent variables are included
in the model because currently there is no theoretical justification for
adding them.
Hypothesis N-1 and N-2 predict that the greater the strategic
advantage to be gained by a sudden withdrawal (i.e., the presence of an
underlying enforcement problem), the more likely there is to be a notice
period as well as a longer notice period. Table 4 shows the results of the
probit analysis, the marginal effects of the probit analysis, and results from
the OLS regression.94

92. Ordinary Least Squares regression is the most popular estimator amongst researchers: it
estimates a parameter from data and applies it to data so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals.
See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 12–14 (5th ed. 2003). If the outcome of interest (the
dependent variable) is binomial, a probit model is used to estimate parameters. In this case, the outcome
of interest – whether or not states include a notice period or a wait period—takes on the value of one
when the states include such provisions and zero when it does not. For further discussion beginning
with a review of the mathematical structures of these models, see M. FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN,
STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 350–58, 458–72 (2d
ed. 2001) for discussions of Ordinary Least Squares and probit models, respectively.
93. A dummy variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when something is true
or is present and 0 when it is not. This variable can provide a useful way to understand how categories
affect an outcome (for instance, how gender affects a specific outcome or whether the post-Cold War
world affects an outcome). See FINKLESTEN & LEVIN, supra note 88, at 380, for a further discussion of
the use of dummy variables in legal studies.
94. In Tables 4 and 5, the N values indicate the number of observations used in the analyses. The
goodness of fit of the models is measured in the R-squared values, which can range from zero to one. A
zero indicates that the model does not improve prediction over the mean model and a one indicates a
perfect prediction.
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Table 4: Explaining Notice Periods – Probit and OLS results

Enforcement problem
Human Rights Issue
Environment Issue
Economics Issue
Constant

N

Probit

Probit Analysis

Analysis

Marginal Effects

OLS Regression

1.57***

.45***

2.82***

.34

.06

(.99)

1.41***

.38***

.89

(.45)

.08

(1.67)

.67*

.22*

.70

(.39)

.11

(1.74)

.26

.10

-1.25

(.32)

.12

(1.52)

-.50 *

7.17 ***

(.28)

(1.41)

142

142

R-squared

85
0.12

Standard errors are indicated in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level

These statistical analyses provide strong support for hypothesis N-1
and N-2. Having an underlying enforcement problem is significant for
explaining the notice periods of withdrawal clauses. As the second column
of Table 4 illustrates, having an underlying enforcement problem increases
the probability of having a notice period by 45 percent. In the regression
results, having an underlying enforcement problem increases the length of
the notice period by 2.82 months, which, given the range of withdrawal
notice periods described above, is quite large. Moreover, all of these results
are highly statistically significant.
Turning to withdrawal wait periods, hypothesis W-1 and W-2 predict
that agreements with underlying commitment problems are more likely to
include a wait period than agreements that do not have any potential shortterm losses. Similarly, the short-term losses and long-term gains dynamic
should increase the length of wait periods for those agreements that
incorporate them. Table 5 illustrates the results of the probit and OLS
regressions.
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Table 5: Explaining Wait Periods – Probit and OLS results
Probit Analysis

Probit

Analysis

OLS Regression

.75**

.26**

13.56***

Marginal Effects
Commitment
problem
Human

Rights

(.32)

(.10)

(1.65)

1.03***

.33***

2.77

(.40)

(.10)

(2.22)

.49

.18

3.27

(.36 )

(.12)

(2.29)

Issue
Environment Issue
Economics Issue
Constant
N

.05

.02

3.49*

(.31)

(.12)

(2.12)

-.15

.80

(.25)

(1.76)

142

R-squared

142

83
0.55

Standard errors are indicated in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level

These statistical analyses provide strong support for hypothesis W-1
and W-2. As the first column in Table 5 illustrates, agreements that are
characterized by an underlying commitment problem are more likely to
include a wait period. In fact, the marginal effects column indicates that an
underlying commitment problem increases the probability of having a wait
period by 26 percent.95 Finally, when looking at the length of wait periods,
having a commitment problem plays a very large substantive role in
determining the length of the period. Having a commitment problem
increases the length of the wait period by 13.56 years, all else held
constant. All the effects are highly statistically significant as well.

95. The marginal effect measures the change in the predicted probability of an event (in this case,
the inclusion of a wait period) given the values of the explanatory variable (in this case, the presence of
an underlying commitment problem). See WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 667 (6th ed.
2008).
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CONCLUSION
One of the goals of this Article is to make connections with law
scholars. Much can be gained from interdisciplinary work which is
especially important for international relations scholars who, because of the
subfield’s focus on anarchy, have been somewhat skeptical of international
law.96 There is no doubt anarchy is important, but if we trumpet it to such a
large degree, we ignore an entire continent of institutions. Moreover, the
institutional variation on the international continent is tremendous, with
differences ranging across multiple dimensions including the rules
governing membership, voting, monitoring, punishments, disputes,
delegation, and as this Article shows, even withdrawal.
When we examine the continent of international law through the
game-theoretic lens of the underlying cooperation problems states are
trying to resolve, we expect differences across international agreements and
institutions. States shape agreements to solve the specific problems they
face; design variations are largely the result of rational, purposeful
interactions. The data strongly suggest that the details of withdrawal
provisions, including the inclusion and length of notice periods and wait
periods, are rationally designed. Enforcement problems lead to a greater
incidence of notice periods and longer ones when they are included while
commitment problems lead to a greater incidence of wait periods and
longer ones when they are included. The findings of this paper contribute to
the growing literature on the rational design of international law and
provide a foundation for further research explaining exit provisions, and
many other provisions of international agreements.

96. See generally John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L
SEC. 5 (1994-95) (arguing that international institutions reflect power relationships and do not
contribute directly to changes in state behavior or stability of relations between states). There are
international law scholars who draw similar conclusions. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law’s roles are limited
since states simply pursue their own interests on the international stage in these venues and law does not
change the behavior of these states).
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Appendix: Agreements in Random Sample
TABLE 1
FINANCE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name

Signatories

Signature Date UNTS #

(Federal Rep. Germany – Ghana)

1980

21671

(Japan – United Arab Rep.)

1968

10576

(Belgium – U.K.)

1953

2526

Agreement concerning financial co-operation on the Lake Volta
Transport System.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Federal Rep. Germany – Congo)

1983

22976

Reciprocal Trade Agreement.

(U.S. – Mexico)

1942

81

Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. Germany – Bangladesh)

1986

25472

(U.K. – Barbados)

1970

10955

(U.S. – Poland)

1946

5851

(Australia – Italy)

1982

25393

1953

2913

1975

14491

1984

24332

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains.
Agreement relating to the purchase by Poland of surplus property
prior to January 1, 1948.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Agreement concerning the disposition of certain accounts in
Thailand under Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 8 (Multilateral)
September 1951.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the
(Denmark – India)
delivery of a linear accelerator to the Cancer Institute.
(Fed. Rep. Germany –
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.
Cent. Afr. Rep.)
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. Germany – Indonesia)

1982

22444

Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. Germany – Niger)

1978

20214

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs.

(U.S. – Ecuador)

1956

4114

Agreement Concerning Financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. Germany – Thailand)

1981

21732

Agreement concerning the collection of bills, drafts, etc.

(Multilateral)

1964

8851

Agreement concerning the compensation of Netherlands interests.

(Netherlands – Egypt)

1971

11868

1979

18930

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital (Czechoslovakia – Norway)
(with protocol).
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TABLE 2
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Signature
Agreement Name

Signatories

UNTS #
Date

Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments.

(U.K. – Yemen)

1982

Agreement concerning financial assistance

(Federal Rep. Germany – Tanzania)

1974

22810
14366

Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement.

(Canada – Senegal)

1979

24875

Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments

(U.K. – Panama)

1983

24700

Convention concerning the mutual promotion and protection of investments.

(France – Syrian Arab Rep.)

1978

19570

(Federal Rep. Germany – Benin)

1978

24681

(U.S. – Nicaragua)

1959

4922

Treaty on the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments of
capital
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to the guaranty of
private investments.
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to investment
(U.S. – Colombia)

6621

guaranties.
The Second ACP-EEC Convention (with protocols, final act and minutes of
(Multilateral)

1979

21071

1978

17730

the Convention).
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to Canadian investments
in Western Samoa insured by the Government of Canada through its agent, the (Canada – Western Samoa)
Export Development Corporation.
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments.

(U.K. – Bangladesh)

1980

19536

Agreement on the mutual protection of investments (with exchange of notes).

(Sweden – China)

1982

22733

Convention on the protection of investments

(France – Mauritius)

1973

13396

(U.S. – Liberia)

1960

5596

(U.K. – Egypt)

1975

15181

(New Zealand – Western Samoa)

1970

11642

(France – Equatorial Guinea)

1982

24657

(China – U.S.)

1952

1837

(U.S. – Zambia)

1966

8901

(U.S. – Cameroon)

1967

9855

(Denmark – Romania)

1980

20625

(France – Haiti)

1984

24323

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to the guaranty of
private investments.
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments.
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the guarantees of
investment securities.
Agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investments.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to guarantees authorized
by Section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to investment
guaranties.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to investment
guaranties.
Agreement on the mutual promotion and guarantee of investments.
Agreement on the mutual promotion and protection of investments (with
exchange of letters)
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Convention concerning the encouragement of capital investment and the
(Netherlands – Tunisia)

1963

7558

(France – Panama)

1982

24235

(Canada – Thailand)

1983

24956

(Denmark – Sri Lanka)

1985

23607

protection of property
Agreement on processing and protection of investments (with exchanges of
letters)
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to Canadian investments
in the Kingdom of Thailand (with related letters).
Agreement concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of
investments.

TABLE 3
MONETARY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE

Agreement Name

Signatories

Signature Date UNTS #

(Iceland – U.K.)

1961

9800

(Japan – Thailand)

1955

3172

(Sierra Leone – U.K.)

1968

9806

(Libya – U.K.)

1968

9815

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum Sterling Proportion by the
Government of Iceland.
Agreement concerning settlement of the “Special Yen Problem.”
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum of Sterling Proportion by the
Government of Sierra Leone.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum Sterling Proportion by the
Government of Libya.
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. of Germany – Somalia)

1983

22962

Agreement concerning financial co-operation.

(Fed. Rep. of Germany – Nepal)

1980

21731

(Belgium - U.K.)

1947

9374

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement regarding the
guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the minimum sterling proportion by Ireland.
Exchange of Notes and Monetary Agreement.

(Netherlands - U.K.)

1945

24

Monetary Agreement.

(Belgium - U.K.)

1947

367
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TABLE 4
TRADE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE

Signature
Agreement Name

Signatories

UNTS #
Date

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning grain to be
supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain to the
(Mali – U.K.)

1975

14430

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Dominican Republic – U.S.)

1968

10249

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Bangladesh – U.S.)

1973

13092

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Republic of Vietnam – U.S.)

1972

12254

Supplementary Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Republic of Vietnam – U.S.)

1968

10135

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Paraguay – U.S.)

1970

11046

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.

(Egypt – U.S.)

1974

13629

1960

5579

Government of Mali within the framework of the Cereals Food Aid
Programme of the European Economic Community.

Agricultural Commodities Agreement under Title I of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (with exchange of (Republic of China – U.S.)
notes).
International Sugar Agreement, 1973 (with annexes).

(Multilateral)

1973

12951

Agreement relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities.

(Mozambique – U.S.)

1977

17753

1957

4365

. (India – U.S.)

1976

15915

(Lebanon – U.S.)

1978

18143

(Mexico – U.S.)

1967

9770

(Cuba – Mexico)

1979

20684

(Japan – U.S.)

1954

3239

(Multilateral)

1962

6389

1964

7450

Agricultural Commodities Agreement under Title I of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act (with agreed minute and (Israel – U.S.)
memorandum of Understanding).
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities (with minutes of
negotiations of 20 March 1978).
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning trade in cotton
textiles (with annex).
Agreement concerning economic, scientific and technical co-operation in
the field of sugar production and sugar by-products (with additional note).
Exchange of notes constituting an interim agreement relating to the
purchase of surplus agricultural commodities.
Agreement with respect to quality wheat.
Exchange of notes (with annex) constituting an agreement regarding the
changes which the Government of the United Kingdom propose to (Argentina – U.K.)
introduce in their production and trade policies relating to cereals.
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TABLE 5
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name

Signatories

Signature

UNTS #

Agreement concerning financial co-operation—Refuse Disposal in the Freetown

(Federal Republic of Germany – Sierra

1980

21678

Metropolitan Area.

Leone)

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on the project Soil management and

(Brazil – Federal Republic of Germany)

1984

23031

(German Democratic Republic –

1976

20644

1975

15109

Date

conservation in East Amazonia.
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection.

Sweden)
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (with agreed

(Japan – U.S.)

minutes).
Agreement concerning the protection of frontier forests against fire.

(Argentina – Chile)

1961

9075

Community-Cost Concentration Agreement on a concerted action project in the

(Multilateral)

1980

20754

(Norway – Sweden)

1969

14017

(Australia – Japan)

1974

20181

(Multilateral)

1954

4714

(U.K. – U.S.)

1979

19699

Agreement for plant protection— Sudan quelea bird research project.

(Sudan – U.S.)

1977

17308

European Agreement on the restriction of the use of certain detergents in washing

(Multilateral)

1968

11210

(Multilateral)

1958

8164

Agreement concerning co-operation in the matter of plant protection.

(Austria – Hungary)

1963

6989

Agreement for cooperation relating to the marine environment.

(Canada – Denmark)

1983

22693

field of analysis of organic micro- pollutants in water.
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the free passage of
salmon in Vanern Lake.
Agreement for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction
and their environment.
International Convention (with annexes) for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in earth sciences and
environmental studies.

and cleaning products.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas.

Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection.

(U.K. – USSR)

1974

13920

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning land use and soil

(Brazil - Federal Republic of Germany)

1979

17973

Agreement on plant protection and phytosanitary quarantine.

(Bulgaria – United Arab Republic)

1966

9963

Agreement concerning the protection of the Sound Oresund from pollution.

(Denmark – Sweden)

1974

13823

African Migratory Locust Convention.

(Multilateral)

1952

10476

Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western

(Multilateral)

1940

485

(Multilateral)

1969

14097

conservation in the eastern Amazon region.

Hemisphere.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.
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International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (with Final Act

117

(Multilateral)

1966

9587

(Multilateral)

1973

16710

(Multilateral)

1979

21623

and Resolution adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries).
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources in the Baltic Sea
and the Belts.
Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution.

TABLE 6
HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Signature
Agreement Name

Signatories

UNTS #
Date

Convention (No. 155) concerning occupational safety and health and the working
(Multilateral)

1981

22345

(Multilateral)

1926

2422

(Multilateral)

1948

1021

(Multilateral)

1968

10823

OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa.

(Multilateral)

1969

14691

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

(Multilateral)

1950

2889

environment.
Protocol (with annex) amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25
September 1926.
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and
crimes against humanity.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(Multilateral)

1966

14668

Convention on human rights and biomedicine.

(Multilateral)

1997

N/A

(Multilateral)

1973

15410

(Multilateral)

1979

20378
132

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Fran-Belgian Agreement on passenger traffic.

(Belgium – France)

1945

Convention (No. 105) concerning the abolition of forced labor.

(Multilateral)

1957

4648

Agreement on the fundamental rights of nationals.

(Congo – France)

1974

21833

Protocol relating to refugee seamen.

(Multilateral)

1973

13928

Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war

(Multilateral)

1949

972

(Multilateral)

1958

5181

(Multilateral)

1973

14861

(Multilateral)

1962

7238

(Multilateral)

1951

2647

(Multilateral

1925

602

Convention (No. 111) concerning discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid.
Convention (No. 118) concerning equality of treatment of nationals and nonnationals in social security
Convention (with Final Protocol) concerning the reciprocal grant of assistance to
distressed persons.
Convention (No. 19) concerning equality of treatment for national and foreign
workers as regards workmen’s compensation for accidents.)

KOREMENOS_FMT5.DOC

118

1/10/2011 9:51:29 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:81

Convention (No. 98) concerning the application of the principles of the right to
(Multilateral)

1949

1341

(Multilateral)

1946

283

(Multilateral)

1969

17955

(Multilateral)

1975

17426

(France – Mali)

1977

20762

organize and to bargain collectively.
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and Agreement on interim
measures to be taken in respect of refugees and displaced persons.
American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jos, Costa Rica.
Convention (No. 143) concerning migrations in abusive conditions and the
promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers.
Convention of establishment.

TABLE 7
SECURITY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE

Signature
Agreement Name

Signatories

UNTS #
Date

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of
(Multilateral)

1972

14860

(Multilateral)

1980

22495

(Multilateral)

1971

13678

(USSR – U.S.)

1972

13445

(Multilateral)

1976

17119

(Multilateral)

1979

23002

(Multilateral)

1967

9068

(U.K. – USSR)

1977

17086

requirements pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the International (Greece – U.S.)

1976

16035

(Portugal – U.S.)

1952

2799

(Korea – U.S.)

1952

2359

1977

17310

2356

bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.
Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic
offensive arms.
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques.
Agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies.
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed
Additional Protocols I and II).
Agreement on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: Eligibility

Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to assurances under the Mutual
Security Act of 1951.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: eligibility
requirements pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control (Malaysia – U.S.)
Act of 1976.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.

(Belgium – U.S.)

1952

Co-operation Agreement on civil defense and security.

(France – Morocco)

1981

20783

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.

(Luxembourg – U.S.)

1952

2384
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Security Treaty.

(Japan – U.S.)

119

1951

1835

1976

16034

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: Eligibility
requirements pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control (Indonesia – U.S.)
Act of 1976.
The Security Treaty.

(Multilateral)

1951

1736

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.

(Italy – U.S.)

1952

2365

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.

(Greece – U.S.)

1951

2382

Exchange of letters constituting an agreement on a defense security arrangement.

(Australia – Netherlands)

1977

21950

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.

(Turkey – U.S.)

1952

2361

(Kuwait – U.S.)

1976

16314

(Multilateral)

1947

324

(France – Sweden)

1973

14951

Technical Security Arrangement concerning special security measures for safeguarding
of certain United States classified military articles, services and information.
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Final Act of the Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security.
Security Agreement concerning certain exchanges of secret information.

